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CROWDFUNDING OR FRAUDFUNDING?
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE SECURITIES
LAWS-WHY THE SPECIALLY TAILORED
EXEMPTION MUST BE CONDITIONED ON
MEANINGFUL DISCLOSURE*
THOMAS LEE HAZEN**
Social networks have been used as a medium for financing films and
other performing arts, as well as for charitable solicitations.
Crowdfunding can also be used to finance small business enterprises,
which, in contrast to other crowdfunding efforts, is a highly regulated
activity by virtue of the securities laws. Securities laws are designed to
provide investor protection. This Article provides an overview of the
applicable securities laws and evaluates the various proposals and the
recently enacted JOBS Act which purportedly provides a workable
exemption for crowdfunding that would not unduly compromise
investor protection. The Article examines the proposals and ensuing
legislation and concludes that the only appropriate exemption for
crowdfunding is one conditioned on meaningful disclosures about the
company and the terms of the offering.
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INTRODUCTION
Social networks have been used as a medium for financing films1
and other forms of art, as well as for charitable solicitations.' These
and similar fundraising endeavors are known as crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding is the fundraising analog to crowdsourcing, which
refers to mass collaboration efforts through large numbers of people,
generally using social media or the Internet.3 Social networks have
the potential for using crowdfunding to reach large numbers of
1. See Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent
Producers Should Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2010,
at 15, 15 (discussing the use of crowdfunding in the film industry).
2. See, e.g., Matt Villano, Small Donations in Large Numbers, with Online Help, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at F31 (discussing websites such as Kickstarter.com, ChipIn.com,
and CreateaFund.com).
3. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your
Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011)
("The concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of crowdsourcing,
which uses the 'crowd' to obtain ideas, feedback and solutions in order to develop
corporate activities. In the case of crowdfunding, the objective is to collect money for
investment; this is generally done by using social networks, in particular through the
Internet (Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and different other specialized blogs). The
crowd - funders (those who provide the money) can at times also participate in strategic
decisions or even have voting right. In other words, instead of raising the money from a
very small group of sophisticated investors, the idea of crowdfunding is to obtain it from a
large audience (the 'crowd'), where each individual will provide a very small amount."
(quoting Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding:
Tapping the Right Crowd 2 (Ctr. for Operations Research & Econometrics, Discussion
Paper No. 2011/32, 2010) (internal citation omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1578175)); Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-83,
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html.
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people. Since crowdfunding is designed to reach a large number of
people, limiting the fundraising request to a small amount from each
donor can provide meaningful funding.4 The solicitation of funds as
gifts or donations is a substantially unregulated activity. There are,
however, charitable solicitation statutes that provide a minimal
degree of consumer (or donor) protection.' In instances of abuse,
online solicitations may be subject to wire fraud statutes.6 The
charitable solicitation and wire fraud statutes, which are beyond the
scope of this Article, provide only minimal protection in comparison
with investor protections of the federal securities laws. This Article
examines various proposals for a special crowdfunding exemption
from the securities laws and concludes that any new exemption for
crowdfunding must be conditioned on meaningful disclosures to
investors about the company and the offering. Only with meaningful
disclosure to investors can an exemption strike the right balance to
encourage small business financing without unduly sacrificing
investor protection.
Crowdfunding can be used to finance small business enterprises
and has been employed outside the United States.7 Unlike raising
money for charities or other nonprofit ventures, a business seeking
investors through crowdfunding implicates the securities laws which
provide investor protection by requiring disclosure and, in many
instances, registration of securities offered to the public. Investor
protection becomes an issue when social networks are used for
widespread solicitation of funds for business enterprises, regardless of
the amount being sought from each investor. The federal securities
laws' pattern is that the exemptions from the more burdensome
securities law disclosures do not apply when there is a general
solicitation8 of potential investors-as is the case with crowdfunding
4. See, e.g., Angus Loten, Crowd-Fund Sites Eye Boom, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2011,
at B10 (discussing crowdfunding for raising capital).
5. See, e.g., 10 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 162.5-162.17 (West 2011). For a summary of
charitable solicitation laws, see Jamie Usry, Charitable Solicitation Regulation for the
Nonprofit Sector: Paving the Regulatory Landscape for Future Success, POL'Y PERSP. (July
30, 2008), http://www.imakenews.com/cppa/earticle001162331.cfm.
6. The federal wire fraud statute is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Tania Kishore Jaleel, Funding Ideas for Returns, Bus. STANDARD (May
5, 2011), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/funding-ideas-for-returns/434488/
(discussing crowdfunding in India); CROWDCUBE, www.crowdcube.com (last visited May
5,2012) (offering a capital-raising crowdfunding site in the United Kingdom).
8. A general solicitation occurs when, through advertising or otherwise, potential
investors are contacted without regard to whether they meet specified sophistication or
accreditation requirements. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2011) (giving examples of a
general solicitation); see also, e.g., 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
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efforts, which reach out to anyone accessing a crowdfunding website.
A few exemptions from the Securities Act of 1933's ("1933 Act")
registration requirements 9 permit a general solicitation of potential
investors, but those exemptions are conditioned on the use of an
offering circular or other mandated disclosure to potential investors.1 °
Suggesting a departure from the current regulatory pattern, there was
discussion in some circles to create a less onerous exemption from the
securities laws to facilitate crowdfunding of business ventures. 1' In
fact, there were a number of proposals to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and Congress urging the adoption of an
exemption for crowdfunding efforts.12
Policymakers continually face the challenge of effectively
balancing the benefits of encouraging small business formation
against the investor protection goals of the securities laws. Without
the crowdfunding exemption that was recently enacted by Congress
and signed into law, 3 crowdfunding would not be a viable capital-
raising method in light of the costs of complying with securities
registration or even the more limited disclosure requirements
available under the exemption set forth in SEC Regulation A. 4
SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.25, at 579-80 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing offeree
qualifications and their relationship to a general solicitation). In March 2012, the House
and Senate agreed on legislation to permit a general solicitation in a private placement,
provided that the solicitation pool is limited to potential investors who qualify as
"accredited investors" under SEC rules. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act ("JOBS
Act"), H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012) (enacted at JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to be codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
9. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2006)), amended
by JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
10. See SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2011); SEC Rule 504, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.504; see also infra text accompanying notes 77-79, 179-83 (discussing Regulation A
and Rule 504).
11. See, e.g., Tim Devaney, Startups Seek New Form of Microfinance, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2011, at A9, available at 2011 WLNR 8154844 (discussing entrepreneurs' lobbying
of the SEC to create a new exemption).
12. See infra Part II.
13. JOBS Act § 302, 126 Stat. at 315 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d); Maria
Lokshin, Obama Signs 'JOBS Act,' Says Law is 'Game Changer' for Small Companies, 44
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 700 (April 6, 2012); see Maria Lokshin, House Votes for
Senate-Amended 'JOBS Act; Bill Headed to President's Desk for Signature, 44 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 643 (April 2,. 2012) [hereinafter Lokshin, House Votes] (describing the final
bill approved by both the House and Senate).
14. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.25-.263. For additional discussion of Regulation A, see infra text
accompanying notes 72, 179-82.
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A number of observers proposed creating a new exemption from
registration tailored to crowdfunding. 15 This Article provides an
overview of the applicable securities laws and evaluates the proposals
that purportedly would provide a workable exemption without
unduly compromising investor protection. This Article concludes,
however, that many of those proposals did not adequately justify a
new exemption. The proponents of an exemption for crowdfunding
found support in those commentators who, as a general proposition,
believe the existing exemptions should be expanded.16 This Article is
limited to the advisability of an exemption tailored to crowdfunding
efforts and thus does not engage in the debate as to whether other
broader exemptions are justified to encourage small business
financing generally. 7
As discussed below, after weighing the various proposals and
bills in the House and Senate, in March 2012, the House and Senate
agreed on a crowdfunding exemption that was signed into law by
President Obama. 18 The statutory exemption mandates SEC action to
implement a crowdfunding exemption according to the guidelines
including required disclosures that are discussed later in this Article. '9
This Article discusses the importance of disclosure in any
crowdfunding exemption and concludes that with the new exemption,
Congress has given the SEC the tools to implement a viable
exemption without unduly sacrificing investor protection.
I. CROWDFUNDING AND THE SECURITIES LAWS
If a crowdfunding effort seeks donations without any express or
implied possibility of a return to the donor, there is no offering of
securities, and thus, the securities laws are not implicated.20
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "A
Moderate Capital," 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 81-82 (2006) (discussing the small issue
exemptions generally and urging increased use of Regulation A). Some observers believe
that the SEC has not been as accommodating to small business as it should. See, e.g.,
Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC's Continuing Failure To
Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1 passim (2007).
17. The exemptions presently strike a reasonable balance. That is not to say that they
might not be improved by tweaking the existing exemptions, but there is no reason to seek
massive overhaul or major expansion of the existing exemptions.
18. JOBS Act § 302, 126 Stat. at 315-21.
19. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
20. The securities laws apply only to offers, sales, and purchases of securities. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (prohibiting offers and sales of securities without adequate
disclosure); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (prohibiting fraud and material misstatements
and omissions in connection with a purchase or sale of securities). A gift does not involve
1739
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Discussion of fundraising efforts not offering the potential for
benefits to the persons solicited is beyond the scope of this Article.
The securities laws apply to offerings of traditional business
investments such as stock, bonds, and certain partnership interests.21
The broad concept of an "investment contract" as a security22 means
that crowdfunding for business ventures cannot bypass the securities
laws by using something other than stock or other traditional
investment vehicles. The statutory term "investment contract" is
broadly construed and would clearly encompass any fundraising
effort that expressly or impliedly offers investors a potential return on
their investment.23 Characterizing the crowdfunding contribution as a
loan rather than an ownership interest likewise will not bypass the
securities laws since notes and indebtedness also fall within the
definition of security.24
Classification of a fundraising scheme as a security means that
absent an applicable exemption, promotion of those investments will
be subject to the 1933 Act.25 Once a company has engaged in a
securities offering registered under the 1933 Act, it becomes subject
to the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("1934 Act").
26
the donor's receiving a security. In addition, since no consideration is promised in return,
it cannot properly be classified as a purchase or sale.
21. Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act includes stock, notes, and investment contracts
within the definition of security. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)
("The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate .... "); see 1 HAZEN, supra
note 8, § 1.6 (discussing the very inclusive definition of security). Limited partnership
interests, limited liability company memberships, and even general partnership interests
offered as a passive investment fall within the definition. See id. § 1.6[10]-[11].
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (expressly including "investment contract" as a security).
23. As explained by the Supreme Court, the term "investment contract" includes the
solicitation of funds in a common enterprise with the expectation of a profit coming
primarily from the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946);
1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 1.6 (discussing the broadly interpreted definition of "security"
under the federal securities laws and the various nontraditional investments that fall
within the definition).
24. The definition of "security" expressly includes a note and other "evidence of
indebtedness." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990)
(stating that notes are presumed to be securities except for (1) notes delivered in
connection with consumer financing, (2) a note secured by a home mortgage, (3) short-
term notes to a small business secured by the business's assets, and (4) bank character
loans). See generally 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 1.6[141 (discussing the classification of a
note as a security).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2006).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-77nn (2006).
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A. Overview of the 1933 Act Registration and Disclosure
Requirements and Ensuing 1934 Act's Periodic Reporting and
Broker-Dealer Registration Requirements
1. 1933 Act Registration and Disclosure Requirements
The first federal securities law followed in the wake of the stock
market crash of 1929. The 1933 Act 27 was enacted as a "Truth in
Securities" Act.28 President Roosevelt described the 1933 Act as a
vigorous consumer protection law.29 The federal securities laws do
not focus on the merits of investments but rather are based on
disclosure to allow sufficiently informed investors to fend for
themselves. The importance of disclosure was premised on Justice
Brandeis's adage that sunlight is the best disinfectant. 3°
The regulatory pattern imposed by the 1933 Act consists of
registration requiring a full disclosure document to investors with
27. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2006)). As
explained in the next Section, even without a 1933 Act registration, a company becomes
subject to the 1934 Act's periodic reporting requirements when its securities are publicly
traded in the secondary markets.
28. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340,
1340-41 (1966). See generally FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939)
(discussing the impact of the 1933 Act); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) (providing an overview of the 1933
Act as originally enacted); Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory
Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1988) (setting forth the history of the 1933
Act and amendments thereto); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) (providing the legislative history of the
1933 Act). For an additional perspective on the history of securities regulation, see
generally John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose
Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001).
29. President Franklin Roosevelt observed that we were moving from a period of
caveat emptor into one of caveat vendor. Message to Congress from President Franklin
Roosevelt (Mar. 29, 1933), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (May 4, 1933) ("This
proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine, 'let the seller also
beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus
to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.").
30. This is the oft-cited phrase of Louis D. Brandeis. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1934) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman."). Felix Frankfurter was one of the most influential voices in
the drafting of the securities laws. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1221-22 (1999)
("Soon after the Securities Act was passed, Frankfurter wrote an article in Fortune
magazine about the anticipated social and financial effects of the Act. Frankfurter was
quite explicit that the purpose of disclosure was to affect the behavior of corporate
managers, bankers, and accountants."); Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II,
FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 53; see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET 71 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing Frankfurter's Fortune article).
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respect to offerings and distributions of securities that end up in the
hands of the investing public.3 Section 5 of the Act makes it unlawful
to offer and sell securities without a registration statement and
required disclosure document known as a prospectus. 2 The
prospectus disclosure requirements include detailed information
about the company and audited financial statements. 3 The 1933 Act
provides exemptions from registration, many of which are
supplemented by or require rulemaking by the SEC.'
Once a company offers securities under a 1933 Act registration
statement, the company is subject to the periodic reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act that are summarized briefly in the
Section that follows.
2. 1934 Act Periodic Reporting Requirements
The 1934 Act's periodic reporting requirements impose
quarterly and interim reporting obligations on publicly traded
companies. 35 Registration under the 1933 Act is one of the events that
can trigger the 1934 Act's periodic reporting requirements.
3 6
Irrespective of an offering registered under the 1933 Act, when a
company's securities are widely traded in the secondary markets, the
company becomes subject to the 1934 Act's registration requirements
that impose a host of other requirements.37 1934 Act registration has
two alternative triggers. Any company with securities listed on a
31. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, chs. 2-3. This includes not only primary distributions
(sold by the issuer), but also secondary distributions wherein the securities are sold by
individuals or institutions who did not acquire the securities in a public offering. See id.
§ 4.26, at 586-93; 2 id. §§ 4.27-.28.
32. Section 5(a) prohibits sales unless a registration statement has been filed with the
SEC and has become effective. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006).
Section 5(c) prohibits offers prior to the filing of the registration statements. § 5(c), 15
U.S.C. § 77e(c). Section 5(b) prohibits written offers unless in the form of an SEC
mandated prospectus and also requires a delivery of such a prospectus prior to sale. § 5(b),
15 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
33. For a discussion of the details of 1933 disclosure requirements, see 1 HAZEN,
supra note 8, ch. 3.
34. The statutory exemptions are found in 15 U.S.C. § 77c-77d.
35. Id. § 78m. The periodic reporting requirements include the filing of quarterly
reports including financial data and also interim reports between quarters for certain
material events. The disclosure requirements are discussed in 2 HAZEN, supra note 8,
§§ 9.0-.6[5].
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
37. The 1934 Act registration triggers are set forth in section 12 of the Act. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781. Once registered under the 1934 Act, a
company becomes subject to the federal proxy regulation, the insider trading reporting
obligation, and many other requirements. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 8, §§ 9.0-.6[5]; 3 id. ch.
10; 4 id. ch. 13; 5 id. §§ 13.3-.6[2].
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national securities exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange
or the Nasdaq Stock Market, must register under the 1934 Act.38 For
companies whose shares are not listed on a national securities
exchange, the registration requirements were triggered if the
company has more than $10 million in assets and at least 500
shareholders of record.39 After considering a number of proposals,'
Congress raised the threshold for companies that are not exempt
from the 1934 Act registration requirements. The JOBS Act amended
section 12(g) to increase the threshold from 500 to 2,000 shareholders
of record but retains the lower 500 record holder threshold with
respect to investors who are not accredited investors.' This means
that without an exemption from 1934 Act registration, even if a
crowdfunding effort can take advantage of an exemption from 1933
Act registration, trading in the secondary markets will be subject to
periodic disclosure and other requirements if the company exceeds
the 500 shareholder and $10 million thresholds. However, the JOBS
Act added section 12(g)(6) that directs the SEC to exempt from the
shareholder calculation any securities acquired in an exempted
crowdfunding offering.42 Instead of periodic reporting, companies
relying on the crowdfunding exemption must make annual reports to
the SEC and to their shareholders. 3
38. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a).
39. Id. § 781(g) (requiring registration for companies with more than $1 million in
assets and at least 500 shareholders of record); SEC Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1
(2011) (raising the asset threshold to $10 million). As part of the JOBS Act, the statutory
threshold was raised to the same $10 million threshold that the SEC had adopted in Rule
12g-1 supra. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. 781(g)(1)(A)).
40. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 6-10 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/FULLCOM/510%20future %20of%20
cap %20form/2011-03-22 %20DEI %20to%20Schapiro-SEC%20-% 20capital%20formation
%20due%204-5.pdf (presenting the issues created by limiting the number of shareholders
that can own shares of a private issuer); Letter from Sarah A. Miller, Senior Vice
President, Ctr. for Sec., Trust & Invs., Am. Bankers Ass'n, to John W. White, Dir., Div. of
Corp. Fin. & James Overdahl, Chief Economist, SEC 3-4 (Nov. 12, 2008) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-483/4483-21.pdf (raising the issue of increasing the 500
shareholder threshold); Letter from Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to Darrell E. Issa,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform 17-22 (Apr. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf (discussing the proposals to
amend section 12(g)'s reporting standards).
41. JOBS Act, § 501, 126 Stat. at 325. Accredited investors are discussed infra note 79.
42. § 303(a), 126 Stat. at 321 (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(6)). The exemption can
either be conditional or unconditional. Id.; see infra note 121.
43. § 302(b), 126 Stat. at 315-16 (to be codified as new section 4A of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1).
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3. 1934 Act Broker-Dealer Registration Requirements
Concerns about crowdfunding sites extend beyond the disclosure
and reporting requirements. For example, when a person or entity
acts as an intermediary between sellers and purchasers of securities,
especially in the context of a public offering of securities, the
intermediary is likely to be subject to its own registration
requirements." Thus, if a crowdfunding site acts as an intermediary
between a company and potential investors, the site may be subject to
the 1934 Act requirement for registration of securities brokers and
dealers.4a
B. Existing Small Issue Exemptions from 1933 Act Registration46
The foregoing registration and disclosure requirements are
consequences of financing a company through a public offering.
There are a number of 1933 Act registration exemptions directed
primarily at small business and small offerings. It is widely recognized
that small businesses are an important part of the U.S. economy and
that there is a value in encouraging small businesses to get started. A
number of federal initiatives apart from the securities laws reflect this
policy. The Small Business Administration ("SBA") is but one
example. 7 Registering securities under the 1933 Act is an expensive
and otherwise burdensome process that presents barriers to small
businesses' access to the U.S. capital markets. Encouraging small
business formation and capitalization thus clashes with the regulatory
investor protection thrust of the securities laws. Mindful of these two
potentially conflicting policies, the federal securities laws include
some exemptions from registration as an incentive to small business
financing.48 Some barriers to small business financing have been lifted
both through relaxed registration requirements 49 and special
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This provision sets forth the broker-
dealer registration requirements. See also infra Part IV (discussing crowdfunding sites as
intermediaries).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
46. Portions of this discussion are adapted from 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, §§ 4.15-.17.
47. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/ (last visited May 5, 2012).
The SBA offers a variety of business initiatives to small businesses including guidance,
loans, and other financial and managerial assistance. Id.
48. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 16, at 79-81 (discussing the small issue exemptions
generally and urging increased use of Regulation A); Cohn & Yadley, supra note 16, at
16-35 (discussing Rule 506 and private offerings exemptions).
49. For many years, the SEC provided relaxed disclosures in Regulation S-B that
were tailored to small businesses. More recently, the SEC eliminated specialized
1744 [Vol. 90
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exemptions from registration for securities offerings by small
businesses.50
In addition to the streamlined registration forms for small
business issuers, Congress and the SEC developed various
exemptions for small issues.5" The small issue exemptions come from
varied provisions of the 1933 Act. Section 4(2) sets forth an
exemption for transactions not involving a public offering5 2 and
applies to offerings to sophisticated investors.53 SEC rules under
section 3(b) provide exemptions for certain offerings not in excess of
$5 million. 4 Section 4(5) provides an exemption for offerings up to $5
million that are made exclusively to accredited investors.55
Exemptions under both section 4(2) and 4(5) are conditioned on the
absence of a general solicitation of investors and thus are not suitable
for crowdfunding offerings. Small issues that are purely local in
nature may qualify for section 3(a)(11)'s intrastate exemption,56
which is not dependent on the size of the offering but also would not
be suitable for crowdfunding because it cannot be limited to the
confines of a single state.
In 1982, the Commission adopted Regulation D5 in an effort to
simplify the overlapping rough edges of the most frequently relied
disclosure forms while at the same time retaining scaled or reduced disclosures for small
businesses. 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.15[2].
50. See, e.g., Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992)
(codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (marking the adoption of SEC Regulation D).
51. See, e.g., J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 §§ 7:196, 8:39-:42 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing small business
investment companies).
52. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006); see 1 HAZEN, supra note
8, § 4.24. The section 4(2) exemption is not limited to small issues. It can be used, and
frequently is used, for large nonpublic offerings. § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). Offerings that
are exempt under § 4(2) may nevertheless be subject to state registration and disclosure
requirements, see infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text, unless the offering is exempt
under Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011). See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)
(preempting state securities laws for specified offerings).
53. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (noting that the section
4(1) exemption applies to offerings solely to investors who are able to "fend for
themselves" and who can obtain sufficient information to make an informed investment
decision); see also, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 899-908 (5th Cir.
1977) (discussing the scope of the nonpublic offering exemption).
54. § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). Unlike the other exemptions mentioned herein, section
3(b) is not self-implementing, but rather requires SEC rulemaking. See 1 HAZEN, supra
note 8, §§ 4.16-.17, 4.21-.22.
55. § 4(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5); see 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.23.
56. § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11); see 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.12.
57. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508; see 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, §§ 4.19-.25. See generally
Theodore Parnall, Bruce R. Kohl, & Curtis W. Huff, Private and Limited Offerings After a
Decade of Experimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12 N.M. L. REV. 633 (1982)
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upon small issue exemptions. Regulation A58 is another exemption
for offerings by an issuer of up to $5 million per year, of which no
more than $1.5 million can be attributed to a secondary offering by
existing shareholders.59 Unlike the other small issue exemptions,
Regulation A is available for offerings using a general solicitation of
investors but is conditioned upon dissemination of a disclosure
document. 60  Regulation A thus is particularly well suited for
crowdfunding efforts. In fact, Regulation A has been recognized as a
convenient vehicle for direct offerings over the Internet. 6' However,
compliance costs limited Regulation A's utility for crowdfunding. In
March 2012 Congress voted to amend the Securities Act of 1933 to
mandate an SEC exemption for offerings up to $50 million pursuant
to a disclosure statement where the securities would be issued without
restrictions on resales.62 This new exemption essentially is patterned
(outlining Regulation D's development); Marvin H. Mohney, Note, Regulation D:
Coherent Exemptions for Small Business Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 121 (1982) (discussing Regulation D when it was first enacted, its
relationship to other securities regulations, and the challenges it creates). Except for Rule
506 offerings, Regulation D offerings may be subject to state disclosure requirements. See
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (preempting state securities laws for specified
offerings).
58. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263; see 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.17; see 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (preempting state securities laws for specified offerings).
See generally Campbell, supra note 16 (discussing the small issue exemptions generally and
urging increased use of Regulation A); Harvey Frank, The Processing of Small Issues of
Securities Under Regulation A, 1962 DUKE L.J. 507 (discussing the operation of
Regulation A when it was adopted). Regulation A offerings may be subject to state
disclosure requirements as well.
59. See Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,443 (Aug. 13, 1992)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.); Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed.
Reg. 9768, 9770 (proposed Mar. 20, 1992). The exemption was limited to issues up to $1.5
million prior to the 1992 amendment. Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,443.
60. Regulation A is the oldest and formerly the most widely used section 3(b)
exemption. 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.17[1]. It is embodied in SEC Rules 251 through
263. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263. The Regulation A exemption is dependent upon the
securities being offered through the use of an offering circular, in a manner similar to the
use of a prospectus in a registered offering. Id. § 230.251(d)(ii)(c). The Regulation A
exemption may not be used for more than an aggregate of $5 million in any one year. Id.
§ 230.251(b).
61. See Mark Anthony Jefferis, Note, Regulation A: Direct Public Offerings and the
Internet, 79 DENy. U. L. REV. 229, 240-43, 255-57 (2001) (discussing the use of Regulation
A for online offerings). An offering exempt under Regulation A likely will have to be
registered under state blue sky laws, which are discussed infra notes 159-63 and
accompanying text.
62. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-116, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (to be codified as
new section 4A of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1).
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on Regulation A.63 The new exemption for offerings up to $50 million
also will require the company to provide audited financial
information as well as annual reports of operations. 64 Presumably,
given the size of the offering, the disclosures will be more rigorous
than those required by the dedicated crowdfunding exemption for
offerings up to $1 million.
6 5
Another section 3(b) exemption is SEC Rule 505, which permits
offerings up to $5 million but is conditioned on the absence of a
public solicitation of investors.66 However, the inability to engage in
general solicitation by reaching out to the general public means that
Rule 505 as currently in force is not readily adaptable to
crowdfunding efforts.
As originally adopted, Rule 504 permitted unrestricted trading of
securities issued under the exemption.67 However, in the mid-1990s,
many companies relied on Rule 504 for online offerings without
registration or any disclosure even close to what would be provided in
a registered offering.68 Typically, companies would issue stock
through the Internet and then provide a bulletin board or other
online trading vehicle whereby initial purchasers could sell their
shares to other investors.6 9 Frequently, these online offerings would
be accompanied by considerable hype concerning the newly issued
securities. In large part as a response to these so-called "pump and
dump" schemes, the SEC amended Rule 504 to prohibit not only a
general solicitation but also to impose restrictions on resale unless the
securities are registered under state law or issued under a state law
63. In addition, offerings under the exemption are subject to 1933 Act § 12(a)(2)'s
cause of action for materially misleading offering materials and misstatements. Securities
Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006).
64. JOBS Act § 401, 126 Stat. at 323 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 771(b)).
65. §§ 301-305, 126 Stat. at 315-23 (to be codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.);
see infra notes 171-88 and accompanying text.
66. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2011); see 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.22.
67. As originally adopted, the exemption was limited to offerings or sales up to
$500,000. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,257-58 (Mar. 16, 1982) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230,.239) (adopting Regulation D). Under the current version of the rule, any
nonpublic company may take advantage of the $1 million ceiling, but the offering cannot
be made through a general solicitation of purchasers, and resales of securities are
restricted unless the offering is registered under state law. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2); see 1
HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.21.
68. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, 64 Fed.
Reg. 11,090, 11,090-91 (Mar. 8, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). This paragraph is
adapted from 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 2.2[3][D].
69. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 11,090-91. This paragraph is adapted from 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 2.2[3][D].
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exemption permitting a general solicitation. 7° The Internet can, of
course, be used for legitimate exempt offerings so long as adequate
steps are taken to assure that offers are made without a general
solicitation and are limited to those persons who are qualified to
receive offers under the exemption in question.7 Alternatively,
raising capital via crowdfunding could be accomplished if effected in
compliance with the disclosures required by the exemption in
Regulation A. Regulation A permits offerings of up to $5 million per
year provided, among other things, that the company is not already
publicly held and, further, that investors are provided with an offering
circular setting forth certain mandated information about the
company and the offering. 72 As noted above, the JOBS Act of 2012
directs the SEC to create an exemption that essentially will expand
Regulation A to cover offerings up to $50 million during a twelve-
month period.73
The pattern that emerges from the existing exemptions from
registration is quite clear. Any exemption that involves a_ general
solicitation of investors will require an offering circular or other
affirmative disclosure. As discussed above, Regulation A requires an
offering circular,74 whereas the intrastate exemption from federal
registration does not.75 However, state securities laws would likely
require registration for purely intrastate offerings involving a general
70. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 11,090-91; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1). While the Internet can still be used for
exempt offerings of securities, the ability to create a public secondary market without
registration has been severely limited, if not eliminated. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1).
71. See, e.g., Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May
29, 1997) (use of Internet was permissible where, in order to obtain access to information
available on the website, a potential investor was be required to complete a questionnaire
designed to allow the issuer to form a reasonable basis for determining that the potential
investor qualified as an accredited investor); Iponet, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL
431821 (July 26, 1996) (use of the Internet to solicit indications of interest from accredited
investors was not a general solicitation under Rule 502 so long as prescreening and the use
of passwords assured that only accredited investors would receive information about the
offering); see also, e.g., Use of Electronic Media, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,843, 25,852 (May 4, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241, 271) (describing instances in which prescreening
methods satisfactorily distinguished accredited investors); cf Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40252 (Jan. 30, 1998) (permitting use of Internet for road
shows for Rule 144A offerings where prescreening assured that only qualified institutional
buyers could access the information on the website).
72. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263; 1 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.17.
73. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(a), 126 Stat. 306, 323-25 (2012).
74. See supra text accompanying note 72.
75. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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solicitation of investors.76 Furthermore, limiting the offering pool to
residents of a single state-as is required for a federally exempt
intrastate offering-renders the exemption unusable for
crowdfunding efforts given the interstate reach of the Internet. Rule
504 allows offerings of up to $1 million but permits a general
solicitation only if offered pursuant to state law mandatory
disclosure. 77 Even in the absence of a general solicitation, the
exemptions generally require that an offering circular, often called a
private placement memorandum, be given to less sophisticated
investors. 78 Except for a Rule 504 offering made without a general
solicitation, exemptions are conditioned on mandatory disclosures
unless the offering is made solely to accredited investors.79
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, prior to the JOBS
Act, there were no exemptions from registration that could be used
for crowdfunding capital raising without requiring that an offering
circular be sent to potential investors prior to their being asked to
make an investment decision. However, the SEC already had
statutory authority to craft an exemption that could apply to
crowdfunding.8 ° As discussed in the next Section, there were a
76. For a discussion of state blue sky laws and their disclosure requirements, see 2
HAZEN, supra note 8, ch. 8.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
78. SEC Rule 505, which allows offerings of up to $5 million per year, does not permit
a general solicitation and does not impose sophistication requirements on the purchasers.
However, Rule 505 does limit the offering to thirty-five unaccredited purchasers, 17
C.F.R. § 230.505, each of whom is entitled to a disclosure document. See SEC Rule 502(b),
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2011) (detailing the disclosure required in Rule 505 and 506
offerings). Rule 506 permits offerings to sophisticated investors and does not impose a
dollar limit. § 230.506. However, as is the case with Rule 505, each unaccredited investor
(of which there can be no more than 35) must receive a disclosure document. § 230.502(b).
In addition, Rule 506 is conditioned on the absence of a general solicitation. As pointed
out supra note 8, Rule 506 will be amended to clarify that a general solicitation is
permitted so long as all of the investors solicited are accredited investors.
79. The term "accredited investors" includes financial institutions and high net worth
individuals. See SEC Rule 215, 17 C.F.R. § 230.215; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(providing a comprehensive definition of accredited investor). Accredited investors also
include directors of the issuer. See § 230.215(d).
80. As noted above, the SEC has the authority under section 3(b) to create an
exemption for offerings of $5 million or less. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b) (2006). A rule could be adopted under section 3(b) to permit general solicitation
of investors and would not have to be conditioned on the existence of an offering circular
given to investors. The SEC also has broad rulemaking authority under section 28 of the
1933 Act that allows for exemptions when deemed in the public interest. § 28, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-3; see 2 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.35, at 70-71 ("The SEC now has a choice of
working within the statutory limitations ... or in expanding those parameters through
rulemaking deemed to be in the public interest.").
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number of proposals to provide such an exemption, and these
proposals led to the JOBS Act.
II. PROPOSALS FOR A NEW CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION FROM THE
SECURITIES LAWS; THE JOBS ACT
A. The Crowdfunding Proposals
A number of proposals for a crowdfunding exemption emerged,
and there was increasing pressure on the SEC to consider a
crowdfunding exemption.8' A bare-bones crowdfunding bill passed
the House," and there were bills pending in the Senate.83 The original
House Bill failed to contain any meaningful investor protections.
There were congressional hearings as well.' The Senate reached a
compromise and approved an amended version of the original House
Bill, which was in turn approved by the House as part of the JOBS
Act. 85
The proposals took various forms. One approach was to allow
extremely simplified and limited disclosures for crowdfunding efforts
soliciting small amounts from each investor.86 Another proposal
would have exempted crowdfunding offerings of up to, $250,000
provided no investor could invest more than $250 or $500 per year,
along with a companion exemption from the Investment Advisers Act
of 194087 for qualified crowdfunding websites.88 Another proposal
81. See, e.g., Yin Wilczek, SEC Under Pressure To Allow Crowdfunding; Agency To
Consider Issue Soon, Official Says, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Sept. 16, 2011), http://news.bna
.com/sdln/SDLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=22850387&vname=sldbuiallissues&wsn=50O
524000&searchid=17343810&doctypeid=l&type=date&mode=doc&split=O&scm=SDLN
WB&pg=0 (noting concerns by some policy makers that crowdfunding could lead to an
increase in fraudulent practices and that investor protection should not be compromised).
82. See Phil Mattingly, U.S. House Approves Looser SEC Rules for Closely Held
Firms, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Nov. 9, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://www.businessweek.com
/news/2011-11-09/u-s-house-approves-looser-sec-rules-for-closely-held-firms.htm.
83. See, e.g., Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-
Disclosure Act of 2011, S. 1970, 112th Cong. (introduced by Sen. Jeff Merkley Dec. 8,
2011); Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (introduced by
Sen. Scott Brown Nov. 2, 2011).
84. See Andrew Ackerman, Fizzled Beer Deal Prompts 'Crowd-Funding' Hearing,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903
927204576570614068591324.html.
85. JOBS Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
86. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 955-60 (proposing that the SEC adopt
"filing and other disclosure requirements [that are] minimal but substantive" and
suggesting specific regulations).
87. The Investment Advisers Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006). The
Investment Advisers Act imposes registration and disclosure requirements on individuals
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would have provided an exemption for crowdfunding offerings up to
$250,000 provided an investor does not invest more than $1,000
during a six-month period.89 Yet another would have allowed
financing by "regular investors" of up to $10,000 per investor, or 10%
of his adjusted gross income.9" Accepting for argument's sake that
such a limitation would be supportable,9" if the exemption without
mandated disclosure is conditioned on limiting amounts from each
investor, who will monitor investors' claims that they meet the
exemption's qualifications?
The SEC acknowledged the push in some circles for a
crowdfunding exemption. 92  Subsequently, President Obama
announced his support for a crowdfunding exemption and increasing
the maximum amount for a Regulation A offering from the current
and firms that provide securities related investment advice for compensation. See § 80b-3
(establishing registration procedures); § 80b-4 (prescribing reporting requirements).
88. See C. Stephen Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 passim (2012). The proposed Investment Advisers Act exemption
would be available to crowdfunding websites that would "(1) be open to the general
public; (2) provide public communication portals for investors and potential investors; (3)
require investors to fulfill a simple education requirement before participating; (4)
prohibit certain conflicts of interest; (5) not offer investment advice or recommendations;
and (6) notify the SEC that they are hosting crowdfunding offerings." Id. at 93.
89. See Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It's Time for the Securities and
Exchange Commission To Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 973,
1000-01 (2011).
90.
Startup Exemption is proposing a plan built around "micro-investors" that it
thinks would minimize the risk of fraud. They want the SEC to allow small
businesses-with fewer than 50 employees and less than $5 million in annual gross
sales-to raise up to $1 million through crowd funding. Regular investors, defined
as people who make less than $200,000 a year and have a net worth below $1
million, would be capped at $10,000 or 10 percent of their adjusted gross income.
But the average investor will only give about $50 to $500, they say, shielding them
from large losses if fraud occurs.
Devaney, supra note 11.
91. For the suggestion that limiting investments to small amounts from each investor
does little if anything to provide meaningful investor protection without either
sophistication or disclosure requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
92. The SEC considered proposals to amend Regulation D to enable crowdfunding
efforts. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham & Jessica Holtzer, SEC Boots Up for Internet Age,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2011, at B1 (describing SEC consideration of crowdfunding
proposals). Previously, the SEC solicited comments on a proposer's rulemaking petition.
See Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Request for Rulemaking To Exempt Securities
Offerings up to $100 from Registration Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, U.S.
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-605/4-605.shtml (last visited May 5, 2012).
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$5 million per year to $50 million per year. 93 The President's proposal
for a specially tailored exemption applied to crowdfunding efforts
seeking to raise less than $1 million, provided that each investor's
contribution would be limited to $10,000 or 10% of each investor's
annual income.94 The President's proposal was not detailed, and at
first it was unclear whether the exemption would be conditioned on
providing investors with information about the company and the
offering. The White House proposal included regulating
crowdfunding platforms. 95
Some of the proposals in Congress would have preempted state
securities laws96 and have provided an exemption for offerings of up
to $5 million per year provided that each purchaser's investment is
limited to the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of the investor's annual
income.' Originally, the proposals for a crowdfunding exemption
received a mixed reception in Congress.98 Nevertheless, the House
Financial Services Committee transmitted the bill to the full House
which passed it with overwhelming support.9 9 The problem with the
93. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet and Overview (Sept. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/american-jobs-act-factsheet.pdf.
94. Id.
95. See Maria Lokshin, Obama Presses Congress To Sign Capital Formation Bills, Will
Sign "Right Away," 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 250 (Feb. 6, 2012) ("Under the
proposal, the offerings would be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and operate within a 'national framework,' conducted through 'regulated online
platforms,' and require the platforms to 'meet the SEC's broker-dealer standards' if they
engage in broker-dealer 'activities.' ").
96. Not surprisingly, state securities administrators have voiced their opposition to
any such preemption. See Letter from Jack Herstein, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs
Ass'n, to House Fin. Servs. Comm. Leadership (Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://www
.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/2930_LetterlO2lll.pdf; infra text accompanying
notes 159-69.
97. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
Although not explicitly limited to crowdfunding, the proposed bill describes its purpose as
"[t]o amend the securities laws to provide for registration exemptions for certain
crowdfunded securities, and for other purposes." Id.
98. See Maria Lokshin, House Subcommittee OK's Crowdfunding, Other Bills Aimed
at Boosting Capital Growth, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 6, 2011), http://://news.bna.com
/sdln/SDLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=23091267&vname=sldbulallissues&wsn=5000320
00&searchid=17343811&doctypeid=l&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=SDLNWB&
pg=0 ("Although the panel cleared the measure, lawmakers found little common ground
on Rep. Patrick McHenry's (R-N.C.) bill, H.R. 2930, to exempt crowdfunding.").
99. See Maria Lokshin, Committee Votes To Report Crowdfunding, Other Capital
Formation Proposals to House, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), http://news.bna.com/sdln/SDLNWB
/split-display.adp?fedfid=23275683&vname=sldbulallissues&wsn=499902500&searchid=1
7343814&doctypeid=l&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=SDLNWB&pg=0 (Oct. 27,
2011) (noting that "subcommittee members found little consensus on several proposals,
including Rep. Patrick McHenry's (R-N.C.) bill to carve out a regulatory exemption for
crowdfunding," but ultimately moved a number of bills "aimed at easing capital formation
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House bill was that like some of the other proposals, the exemption
was not conditioned on meaningful disclosure. In contrast, the
proposed crowdfunding exemption found in Senate Bill 1791100 was
conditioned on disclosure "to investors all rights of investors,
including complete information about the risks, obligations, benefits,
history, and costs of offering."'' The proposed exemption was to
allow a maximum of $1,000 investment per investor and, further,
would be conditioned on an offering of no more than $1 million per
year."° This was clearly a step in the right direction, although it did
not explicitly go quite far enough.
A viable crowdfunding exemption should include not only
disclosure of the "risks, obligations, benefits, [and] history"' 3 of the
offering, but also meaningful disclosure of the nature of the business
sufficient to enable investors to evaluate the merits of the securities
being offered. This was the approach subsequently taken by proposed
Senate Bill 1970 to permit crowdfunding offerings up to $1 million
per year with the SEC having the authority to adjust the ceiling."°
Senate Bill 1970 placed a limit on each individual's investment using a
sliding scale based on the investor's annual income. 105 The proposed
bill limited the aggregate crowdfunding investments an investor could
make in any year, 106 although this could be difficult to enforce if the
investor uses multiple crowdfunding sites. Senate Bill 1970 also
required that any website offering crowdfunding opportunities either
be registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer or be registered under
for small businesses" to the full House); Mattingly, supra note 82; see also, e.g., Maria
Lokshin, Obama's Jobs Council Endorses Crowdfunding, SOX Amendments, Sec. L. Daily
(BNA), http://news.bna.com/sdln/SDLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=23279612&vname=
sldbulallissues&wsn=499895000&searchid=17343816&doctypeid=l&type=date&mode=do
c&split=0&scm=SDLNWB&pg=0 (Oct. 28, 2011) (noting White House support for a
crowdfunding exemption).
100. Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (introduced by
Sen. Scott Brown Nov. 2, 2011).
101. Id. § (b)(1)(A).
102. Id. § (a)(3).
103. Id. § (b)(1)(A).
104. Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act
of 2011, S. 1970, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (introduced by Sen. Jeff Merkley Dec. 8, 2011).
105. Investors with an annual income of less than $50,000 would be able to invest up to
$500; investors with an annual income between $50,000 and $100,000 would be able to
invest 1% of their annual income in a crowdfunding offering; and investors with over
$100,000 annual income would be able to invest up to 2% of their annual income. Id.
§ 2(a).
106. Id. § 4A(a)(9).
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a streamlined procedure as a "funding portal."' 7 Meaningful
disclosure to potential investors needs to be part of any proposal
striking a proper balance between investor protection and the desire
to encourage small business financing. While Congress was
considering the various proposals, the Small and Emerging
Companies Advisory Committee established by the SEC declined to
recommend a crowdfunding exemption, recognizing the need to give
adequate deference to investor protection.0 8
B. The JOBS Act
The Senate eventually agreed on a compromise version of the
House Bill by adding a number of significant investor protection
provisions that had been included in the earlier Senate proposals. 109
The compromise bill passed both the Senate and House by
overwhelming margins, and President Obama signed the bill into
law."0 As described in the discussion that follows, the resulting JOBS
Act " ' requires disclosure to investors for offerings under the new
107. Id. § 4A(a)(1); see also id. § 4(a)(1) ("The Commission shall, by rule, as the
Commission determines appropriate, exempt funding portals from the registration
requirements of section 15(a)(1), conditionally or unconditionally, provided that such
funding portals remain subject to such examination by the Commission and a national
securities association and to such other requirements under this title as the Commission
determines appropriate under such rule."). President Obama's proposal similarly included
SEC regulation of crowdfunding sites. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108. See Maria Lokshin, SEC Small Business Panel Recommends Raising 12(g)
Reporting Trigger to 1,000, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 265 (Feb. 6, 2012) ("The panel,
however, tabled a draft recommendation that the commission 'review and consider'
proposals to exempt crowdfunding from 1933 Securities Act registration. 'In terms of
crowdfunding, I'm not sure we're in a position to make a meaningful recommendation,'
Graham said. 'This whole area is fraught with danger.' Maeder echoed the view. 'I would
suggest that the SEC be very cautious,' he said. 'I think this is a very hot potato and a
dangerous one at that.' Catherine Mott, founder and CEO of BlueTree Capital Group and
BlueTree Allied Angels, said equity may not be the right type of ownership for
crowdfunding. Companies seeking 'follow-on funding' will have a hard time getting it from
sophisticated investors, she said. Along that vein, Graham said small companies, which
would be most likely to issue crowdfunded securities, may not understand all the
regulatory issues that follow the offering. 'I don't know how you provide a regulatory
framework that protects people from their own ignorance,' he said.").
109. See Lokshin, House Votes, supra note 13 (describing the final bill approved by
both the House and Senate).
110. Id.
111. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to be codified at scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Act also implements a number of other provisions, including
raising the trigger for companies having to file periodic reports with the SEC, and creating
a new category of "emerging growth company," which is a company having less than $1
billion in annual total gross revenues. Id. §§ 101-105, 126 Stat. at 307-11. This threshold
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crowdfunding exemption that will be codified in sections 4(6) and 4A
of the Securities Act of 1933.112 The new exemption requires
registration of crowdfunding portals113 and significant preemption of
state law.
11 4
The new crowdfunding exemption limits the amount of money
that a company may raise from any investor. With respect to investors
having annual income or net worth below $100,000, a company may
not sell securities exceeding the greater of $2,000 or 5% of the
investor's annual income or net worth within a 12 month period.
115
For investors over the $100,000 annual income or net worth
threshold, the 12 month investment is capped at 10% of the investor's
annual income or net worth but not to exceed $100,000 over the 12
month period." 6 In addition, the maximum amount a company can
raise under the crowdfunding exemption is $1 million every twelve
months. 117
The new crowdfunding exemption is conditioned on providing
investors with certain disclosures that must also be filed with the SEC.
The required disclosures include the offering's purpose, the targeted
amount to be raised, the deadline for reaching such amount, and the
offering price.1 18 Significantly, risks to investors also must be disclosed
as well as any additional information as the SEC may prescribe. The
Act also expressly requires information about the company, its
officers, directors, and major shareholders in addition to a description
of the company's business, business plan, capital structure, and
financial condition.'19 Audited financial statements are required for
offerings over $500,000 or other threshold that may be imposed by
SEC rulemaking. 2 ° The only advertising permitted is advertising that
directs interested investors to the registered funding portal or
registered broker handling the offering. The company may not
compensate promoters of the offering unless the compensation is
disclosed. The Act also imposes reporting obligations beyond the
offering. For companies not subject to the 1934 Act's periodic
will be adjusted every five years as appropriate in light of inflation. Id. § 101, 126 Stat. at
307-08.
112. Id. § 302, 126 Stat. at 315-21.
113. Id. § 304, 126 Stat. at 321-22.
114. Id. § 305, 126 Stat. at 322-23.







NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reporting requirements, crowdfunded companies must file annual
reports and provide investors annually with reports on the results of
operations and financial statements. The JOBS Act further directs the
SEC to exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, securities acquired
through the crowdfunding exemption from the 1934 Act's calculation
of shareholders of record as a trigger for the registration and periodic
reporting obligations. 121
The intermediary for a crowdfunding offering must be registered
with the SEC either as a broker-dealer or under the new registration
category for a crowdfunding portal. 2 2 In addition to SEC registration,
the SEC is directed to adopt rules requiring the broker or funding
portal to provide disclosures to investors relating to risks and investor
education materials. 123 These rules will also require the broker or
funding portal to take steps to ensure that investors review the
disclosures, answer various questions, and affirm that they understand
the risk of loss.124 The broker or registered funding portal will also be
required to investigate the background of regulatory compliance by
the company's officers, directors, and major shareholders. The broker
or funding portal must make certain information available to
investors and the SEC at least twenty-one days in advance of the
offering. 125 The broker or funding portal must also follow SEC rules
designed to assure that purchasers have not exceeded the investment
cap for all crowdfunding offerings by any issuer during a twelve-
month period. 126 The Act further requires the broker or funding
portal to be sure that the offering proceeds are turned over to the
issuer only when the target offering amount is reached.
127
The JOBS Act also addresses the role of the states in
crowdfunding regulation. State blue sky law registration requirements
for public offerings are preempted unless the issuer of the securities
has its principal place of business in the state or more than fifty
121. Id. § 303, 126 Stat. at 321 (to be codified as new section 12(g)(6) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)) ("The Commission shall, by rule, exempt,
conditionally or unconditionally, securities acquired pursuant to an offering made under section
4(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 from the provisions of this subsection."); see supra note 42.





127. Id. In addition, the broker or funding portal must protect investor privacy and not
compensate promoters, finders, or others for providing potential investors' personal
identifying information. The broker or funding portal nor its directors, officers, or partners
may have any financial interest in a company using its crowdfunding services.
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percent of the crowdfunding offering's proceeds are purchased by
residents of the state. 128 Thus, it is possible that two states could
impose their registration requirements if the company's principal
place of business is in one state and more than half of the offering's
proceeds are raised in the other state. In addition, preemption
extends to regulation of funding portals except for the state of the
crowdfunding portal's principal place of business. 129 The funding
portal's principal place of business may regulate the portal but not by
imposing requirements greater than those imposed by the SEC. 3 '
III. THE SECURITIES LAWS' ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS AND
PRIVATE REMEDIES
While it is true that the securities laws' anti-fraud provisions13" '
apply to transactions that are exempt, the SEC's resources are
limited, and the Commission cannot be expected to be effective in the
crowdfunding arena-especially considering widely reported
enforcement failures involving much larger economic stakes.
13 2
Beyond SEC enforcement, the anti-fraud provisions offer some
private remedies to injured investors. For example, SEC Rule 10b-5 133
provides a remedy to investors who can demonstrate a causal
connection between a material misstatement or omission in
connection with a securities transaction and resulting damages."3 A
significant limitation is that in addition to being able to prove loss
causation, 3 5 the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant acted
128. Id. § 305, 126 Stat. at 322-23.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Section 17 of the 1933 Act prohibits fraud and misstatements in the offering and
sale of securities. Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006). Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act prohibit fraud and misstatements in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
1934 Act Rule 10b-5, unlike 1933 Act § 17(a), provides an implied private remedy to
injured investors. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 7.11[2][C]; 3 id. § 12.2[2], at 514-15.
132. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Across Borders,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at Al (discussing the growth and collapse of Bernard Madoff's
Ponzi scheme); see also Kara Scannell, Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 5,2009, at C1 (discussing the SEC and other regulators' examination of Madoff
and their inability to uncover the scheme).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
134. For discussion of the remedy available under SEC Rule 10b-5, see generally 3
HAZEN, supra note 8, § 12.3.
135. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005) (holding that
the plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action bears the heavy burden of establishing a causal
connection between the fraudulent transaction and provable damages). But cf Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186-87 (2011) (holding that loss
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with scienter, which means he had the intent to deceive or acted with
a highly reckless disregard for the truth. 3 6 While it is true that a class
action involving securities that are not widely publicly traded may not
be subject to the heightened pleading standards of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act,137 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require fraud claims to be pled with heightened
specificity.'38 Furthermore, for more than thirty-five years, the
Supreme Court has given narrow scope to implied private remedies
generally and to Rule 10b-5 in particular. For example, it is not
sufficient to establish that the defendant created the material
misstatement or omission, he must have actually made the
statement. 13 9
In contrast to Rule 10b-5, the Securities Act of 1933 includes two
express remedies available to investors injured as a result of material
misstatements or omissions in connection with the offering of
securities. Section 11 of that Act provides a relatively robust remedy
which does not require scienter and can be brought against a number
of defendants who did not actually make the statement at issue.
140
However, the section 11 remedy is limited to misstatements and
omissions made in a registration statement filed pursuant to a full-
fledged registered public offering. 141 As such, it would not be
available to crowdfunding investors where the offering takes place
under the aegis of an exemption from registration. The second 1933
Act remedy is found in section 12(a)(2), which allows private actions
causation need not be established as a precondition to certification of a class action but
must be established prior to an award of damages).
136. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (stating that
scienter is a prerequisite to finding a violation of Rule 10b-5); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 685 (1980) (finding that scienter is not limited to private suits and thus is an
element of an SEC suit based on Rule 10b-5); cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319-25 (2007) (discussing pleading standards under Rule 10b-5).
137. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 738 (to be codified as new section
27(a)(2)(A) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1); id. § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 743
(to be codified as new section 21D(a)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
139. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011). In
addition, private actions cannot be brought on the basis of aiding and abetting liability. See
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994);
see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
(discussing primary liability and the necessity of establishing that the plaintiff had a basis
for relying on the defendant's participation in the misstatement or omission).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). For a discussion of the scope of the remedy, see 2 HAZEN
supra note 8, §§ 7.3-.5, at 109-65.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (explicitly limiting the remedy to misstatements and omissions in a
registration statement).
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against sellers14 2 of securities who make material misstatements or
omissions in the offer or sale. 143 Although not expressly limited to
registered or public offerings, the Supreme Court has limited the
section 12(a)(2) remedy to offerings made by use of a prospectus or
similar offering circular. 144 This limitation on the section 12(a)(2)
remedy highlights the need for an offering circular requirement in any
offering using a general solicitation as is the case with crowdfunding.
The JOBS Act amends section 12 of the 1933 Act to expressly include
a remedy for misstatements and omissions made in connection with
an offering under the new crowdfunding exemption. 1
45
The foregoing provides an overview of the relatively limited
remedies for material misstatements or omissions made in connection
with securities offerings that are exempt from SEC registration. These
remedies are not sufficient to protect investors in crowdfunding
offerings without registration or an exemption that is conditioned on
the use of an offering circular. Even with an exemption mandating the
use of an offering circular, the impact of the private remedies must be
tempered by the fact that a relatively small crowdfunding effort will
result in relatively modest potential damages, thus raising questions
regarding the economics of bringing such a claim and the adequacy of
the economic incentives to plaintiffs law firms to bring suit on a
contingent fee basis.
IV. CROWDFUNDING AND SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AS
INTERMEDIARIES
The registration and disclosure provisions expressly apply to any
person who offers or sells a security. 146 Traditionally, brokerage firms
acting as underwriters distribute securities as part of a public offering.
Acting as an intermediary for a securities offering likely entails
offering securities for sale. This includes social networking sites that
connect their viewers with crowdfunding offerings. In addition,
dedicated crowdfunding sites run the risk of running afoul of the law
142. The defendant must have been the seller of the securities and also must have been
in privity with the plaintiff. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641-55 (1988) (discussing the
narrow definition of seller in section 12).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2). For a discussion of the scope of the remedy, see 2 HAZEN,
supra note 31, §§ 7.6-8.
144. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578-84 (1995).
145. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 316-21 (2012) (to be
codified as new section 4A of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1).
146. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (prohibiting offers and sales by "any person"); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (prohibiting fraud and material misstatements by "any person").
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applicable to securities brokers and dealers. 4 7 It does not matter
whether the site acting as an intermediary in a securities transaction
receives specific compensation for its efforts.
Acting as an intermediary in a securities offering will classify that
person as an "underwriter"' 148 even if the intermediary is not a
traditional securities professional. 149 For example, a nonprofit
organization was an underwriter because it was a conduit from an
offshore issuer to investors in the United States. 50 A website acting as
a conduit for securities sales similarly would be an underwriter even if
not compensated.'51 A social network that provides links to
crowdfunding efforts would likely receive underwriter status and be
subject to consequences under the 1933 Act. 52  Dedicated
crowdfunding sites 5 3 would clearly qualify as underwriters of any
offering efforts. Further, their activities could expose them to the
1934 Act's registration requirements for securities brokers since
acting as an underwriter can by itself be sufficient to require
registration as a broker-dealer. 154
Section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act requires securities brokers and
dealers to register in order to conduct their business unless they
operate solely intrastate or are otherwise exempted from
registration. 55  Registration subjects the broker-dealer to many
147. See 15 U.S.C. §78o(a)(1). For additional discussion of the broker-dealer
implications for crowdfunding sites, see Bradford, supra note 88, at 33-43.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) ("The term 'underwriter' means any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in
any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect
underwriting of any such undertaking ....").
149. See generally 2 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.27, at 5-24 (discussing the expansive
definition of "underwriter").
150. See, e.g., SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738, 739-41 (2d Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) (finding that a benevolent association helping
China distribute bonds was an underwriter and violated the securities laws since the
offering was not registered).
151. The court issued an injunction against Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Association for proceeding without registration even though the conduit was acting for
benevolent purposes and was not compensated. Id. at 740.
152. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (listing the possible
penalties imposed for violations of the 1933 Act).
153. For examples of dedicated crowdfunding sites, see supra note 2.
154. See, e.g., Paul A. Barrios, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-7810, 34-42531, 71 SEC
Docket 2070, 2070, 2000 WL 279232 (Mar. 15, 2000) (ordering a cease-and-desist
proceeding against the defendant for his participation in unregistered offerings); SEC v.
Milan Capital Grp., Inc., Litigation Release No. 16405, 71 SEC Docket 1080, 1080, 2000
WL 12467 (Jan. 10, 2000).
155. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.*§ 78o(a)(1) (2006).
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reporting requirements and also impacts its daily operation and
organizational structure. 15 6 The need to register is triggered by acting
as a broker or dealer in securities. "Broker" is defined in the 1934 Act
to include any person engaging in the business of buying and selling
securities for others.157 Websites facilitating crowdfunding efforts
could easily qualify as a broker or, as noted above, as underwriters.
Either way, registration would be required absent an exemption. As
noted above, the new crowdfunding exemption is conditioned on
using a registered broker dealer or a registered funding portal.'58
V. IMPACT OF STATE SECURITIES LAWS
Even before Congress introduced the 1933 Act, state securities
regulation had existed for more than twenty years. 159 Typically, state
securities laws require registration and disclosures for securities
offerings made within the state.16°
Absent registration or an applicable exemption, offerings to
investors are likely to violate state securities law. For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the Massachusetts Secretary of State's cease
and desist order against a website offering securities without
registration under state law.'6
Prior to 1996, registration of public offerings was required in
each state in which the securities were offered for sale. 162 However, as
a result of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996163 ("NSMIA"), state registration and disclosure requirements
are preempted for offerings registered under the 1933 Act and
156. Section 15(b) and SEC rules promulgated thereunder set forth the registration
requirements. § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b). The information to be supplied in the
registration materials includes a detailed description of the broker-dealer's assets and
financial condition, including a showing of compliance with the Commission's net capital
rule, which imposes minimum solvency requirements on broker-dealer firms. See 5
HAZEN, supra note 8, § 14.5[1].
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) ("The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.").
158. H.R. 3606, 112 Cong. § 304 (2d Sess. 2012).
159. In 1911, Kansas enacted the first state securities act and other states followed suit
by enacting state securities laws that are commonly referred to as blue sky laws. See 2
HAZEN, supra note 8, § 8.1[1][A] at 420; supra note 76 and accompanying text.
160. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 8, ch. 8.
161. Bulldog Investors v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 953 N.E.2d 691, 718 (Mass. 2011)
(upholding state's ability to pursue website under Massachusetts law).
162. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 8, § 8.1[3].
163. National Securities Market Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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offerings exempt under a few specified 1933 Act exemptions. Section
18(b) of the 1933 Act sets forth the scope of NSMIA preemption.
164
For example, certain private placements conditioned on the absence
of a general solicitation a65 and offerings made within a single state
166
are not covered by NSMIA preemption. NSMIA does not preempt
the states from imposing their registration and disclosure
requirements for offerings that involve a general solicitation across
state lines. For example, Regulation A, which, at least in theory,
could be used for crowdfunding, does not preclude state law from
mandating its own registration and disclosure. Any new exemption
that would cover crowdfunding efforts similarly would not be within
NSMIA's preemption without legislative action. Accordingly, to be
effective in reducing registration costs, Congress needed to amend
section 18(b) of the 1933 Act to expand NSMIA's preemption.
167
Prior to the JOBS Act, there was little the SEC could do to
change the securities regulation landscape for crowdfunding without
congressional action. In opposition to the proposals to preempt state
law, 168 the North American Securities Administrators Association
indicated that it may be crafting rules for crowdfunding and other
small business financing techniques. 169 Preemption of state laws
without a meaningful disclosure requirement for a federal
crowdfunding exemption would unduly limit the states' ability to
prevent fraud in small offerings. As previously noted, the JOBS Act
164. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
165. Section 18(b) preempts state registration and disclosure mandates for private
placements that are exempt from registration by virtue of a rule implementing section
4(2)'s exemption for transactions not involving a public offering. To date, SEC Rule 506 is
the only rule that qualifies for NSMIA preemption for private placements. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506 (2011).
166. Section 3(a)(11) exempts offerings where securities are offered and sold only to
residents of a single state. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
167. See Pope, supra note 89, at 1001 (proposing that Congress amend section 18(b) to
enable preemption of state securities laws for crowdfunding offerings); see also Bradford,
supra note 88, at 4-5 (proposing to preempt state regulation of crowdfunding for federally
exempt offerings). Of course, such an expansion of preemption would not be necessary if
it is determined that the existing exemptive scheme is appropriate.
168. See Letter from Jack Herstein, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, to House
Fin. Servs. Comm. Leadership, supra note 96.
169. News Release, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, State Securities Regulators To Explore
Steps To Help Small and New Businesses Raise Investment Capital (Oct. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.nasaa.org/7187/state-securities-regulators-to-explore-steps-to-help-
small-and-new-businesses-raise-investment-capital/. Even without rulemaking, state
securities administrators can shut down crowdfunding efforts that are neither registered
under nor exempt from state blue sky registration requirements. See ProFounder Fin., Inc.
(Cal. Dept. of Corps. Aug. 21, 2011) (consent order to cease crowdfunding activities),
available at http://www.corp.ca.gov/ENF/pdf/2011/ProFounderCO.pdf.
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preempts state law in most respects while also mandating disclosure
to investors. 170
VI. INVESTOR PROTECTION WOULD BE UNDULY SACRIFICED BY
AN OVERLY PERMISSIVE EXEMPTION FOR CROWDFUNDING
As noted above, there are many who proposed that the merits of
encouraging crowdfunding efforts limiting the amount any one
investor can commit justify a new exemption from 1933 Act
registration without requiring meaningful disclosure to investors. The
SEC has been consistent in conditioning offerings to the general
public on mandatory disclosures.' The benefits of crowdfunding do
not justify a departure from this pattern. In order to give proper
deference to investor protection, any exemption applicable to
crowdfunding should be conditioned on mandatory disclosures,
perhaps a bit less rigorous than those currently required in
Regulation A offerings."i
Many of the proponents of a new or special crowdfunding
exemption from 1933 Act registration forgot the telling history of
Rule 504's exemption for offerings of $1 million or less. As originally
adopted, Rule 504 provided an exemption for nonpublic companies to
permit offerings of $500,000 or less and had no specific disclosure
requirements, although it did not permit a general solicitation of
investors unless the offering was made in compliance with state law
disclosure requirements. 1 Securities issued under Rule 504 were not
subject to resale restrictions and thus could be traded freely among
investors. 174 However, as the Internet became more popular and
widely used, online securities offerings took off and many less
scrupulous promoters used the Rule 504 exemption for bogus or
fraudulent offerings. 75 Accordingly, the SEC responded by amending
Rule 504, for which the ceiling had already been raised to $1 million,
to its current form. Rule 504 no longer allows exempt offerings under
the rule to be made through a general solicitation, nor does it allow
170. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
172. Even Rule 505's exemption, which does not permit offerings using a general
solicitation, mandates disclosure to unaccredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2011).
173. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,257-
58 (Mar. 16, 1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (adopting Regulation D).
174. Id. at 11,252.
175. See, e.g., Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,091 (Mar. 8, 1999) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
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unrestricted aftermarket trading unless the issuer of the securities has
complied with applicable disclosure requirements under the law of at
least one state.
176
No doubt, there is a public policy that favors encouraging small
business capital raising efforts. In fact, Congress and the SEC
recognized this with their small business initiatives. 177 For example,
smaller companies may take advantage of scaled disclosure that is less
onerous than the disclosure requirements applicable to most public
companies. 178 Encouraging small business financing is the primary
thrust of SEC Regulation A, which permits what are in essence public
offerings of less than $5 million per year with an even more
significantly scaled back disclosure document. 179 As noted above,
many of the existing small issue exemptions are conditioned on the
absence of general solicitations to potential investors. 8 ° Others are
conditioned on investors' sophistication or ability to fend for
themselves.'81 The small issue exemptions that permit general
solicitations mandate the use of an offering circular to provide
information about the company and the investment opportunity being
offered.'82 In addition, by relying on Rule 504 for offerings up to $1
million,8 3 small businesses can target unsophisticated investors,
evading the disclosure requirements so long as the investors are not
strangers and therefore are not the result of a general solicitation.
The current exemption landscape allows small businesses to seek
private financing from sophisticated and accredited investors without
mandated disclosures since those investors can fend for themselves.' "
There is good reason for these limitations, and the burden of
justifying a deviation from the current pattern should fall on the
176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. In addition, securities offered under the Rule 504 exemption
may not be freely resold absent state disclosure compliance.
177. See, e.g., Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94
Stat. 2275 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Revision of Certain Exemptions
from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6389,47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
230 & 239) (adopting Regulation D).
178. SEC Regulation S-K sets forth the disclosure requirements, including the scaled
disclosure for smaller companies. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.100 (2011).
179. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263; see supra text accompanying note 14.
180. See supra notes 10, 77-79 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 53.
182. E.g., Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263.
183. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
184. Such offerings could take place under section 4(2)'s non-public offering
exemption or under Regulation D's Rules 505 or 506. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505-506.
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proponents of a crowdfunding exemption. The original House version
of the JOBS Act did not meet this burden with respect to an
exemption that would not have contained an affirmative disclosure
requirement about the company and the offering sufficient to enable
potential investors to make an informed investment decision. The
exemption proposed in Senate Bill 1791185 was a step in the right
direction. The JOBS Act conditions the crowdfunding exemption on
disclosure to investors 86 which quite properly preserves the proper
balance by encouraging small business financings while also giving
appropriate consideration to investor protection. Only time will tell
whether the express disclosure requirements in new section 4(6) of
the 1933 Act will be sufficient to provide meaningful investor
protection. 187 If not, the SEC can correct the situation. As noted
earlier, the crowdfunding exemption expressly authorizes the SEC to
impose additional requirements.
18
It is naYve to assume that limiting offerings to small amounts per
investor will deter scammers from taking advantage of investors via
crowdfunding. Even limiting the exemption to relatively small
amounts such as $250 or $500 does not mean that there is an
insufficient investor-protection stake such that scrutiny is not
warranted.18 9 Why does a small amount of money from many
investors present less of an investor-protection threat than more
significant amounts of money from fewer investors? While the
argument that the limited risk exposure per investor warrants less
regulation may have some surface appeal, a deeper analysis does not
support this as the primary basis for a specially tailored exemption,
unless the exemption is conditioned on meaningful disclosures to
investors. Also, although it is often said that good things come in
small packages, fraud can come in small packages, too. 19° Fraud in
small packages can be just as effective and damaging to the victims,
185. Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (introduced by
Sen. Scott Brown Nov. 2, 2011); see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
187. JOBS Act, Pub L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315-21 (2012) (to be codified
as new section 4A of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1).
188. Id.; see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
189. Some of the proposals would have allowed larger contributions by each investor.
See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
190. In fact, Charles Ponzi, who created the Ponzi scheme perpetrated his fraud by
raising relatively small amounts of money from a large number of people. See infra note
199.
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many of whom may be least able to bear the risk of even a small
investment in a speculative business. 191
Investors in crowdfunding offerings are likely to be strangers to
the company and, as such, would have no information about the
company except that provided by the company or the website where
the securities are offered for sale. If anything, the impersonal nature
of the Internet would seem to call for more, rather than less, investor
protection. Also, the solicitation of small investors is likely to attract
more unsophisticated investors who are in need of the investor
protection provisions generally found in the securities laws. It also is
likely to attract investors with limited funds who cannot tolerate high
investment risk, even for small amounts of money. 192 Furthermore, if
an overly permissive crowdfunding exemption were recognized, what
is to prevent scammers from repeatedly going to the same investors
for purportedly different investments? Even putting aside scammers
who are trying to bilk the public, crowdfunding offers the potential
for raising large amounts of money, warranting the mandatory
disclosure that is required by the federal securities laws.
193 I
Depending on the aggregate amount of money being raised,
there are plenty of existing exemptions, although as noted above,
many of them preclude offering by general solicitation.194 Under
191. If, as the proposals suggest, the limited dollar exposure of each investor is a
precondition of the exemption, who will monitor this? Will crowdfunding operations have
to do their due diligence to assure that investors in fact qualify? If not, what is to prevent
an investor from making multiple investments that are not in compliance with the
exemption's limitations?
192. It has been suggested that people who cannot afford the risk are lured to gambling
as a chance to hit it big in order to exit from their dire economic circumstances. See, e.g.,
ANN FABIAN, CARD SHARPS, DREAM BOOKS & BUCKET SHOPS: GAMBLING IN 19TH-
CENTURY AMERICA 11 (Cornell Univ. Press 1990); Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational
Investment, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and
Their Effects on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 1002 (1992)
("One of the factors that has motivated people to become gamblers and speculators is that
'hitting it big' offers them the opportunity to cross economic barriers that could not
otherwise be transcended by rational investment strategies.") (citing VICKI ABT, JAMES F.
SMITH & EUGENE MARTIN CHRISTIANSEN, THE BUSINESS OF RISK: COMMERCIAL
GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA passim (1985)).
193. In the SEC's first publicized enforcement action, it exacted a settlement with
respect to successful crowdfunding efforts. The agency in question was seeking $300
million and had already received $200 million in pledges. Migliozzi, Securities Act Release
No. 33-9216, 2011 WL 2246317 (June 8, 2011) (resulting in a consent cease and desist order
regarding crowdfunding efforts without registration), as described in SEC News Release
2011-122 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-122.htm.
The offering that was eventually shut down before any actual funds changed hands was an
attempt to find a purchaser for Pabst Brewing Company.
194. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
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existing law, general solicitation offerings require affirmative
disclosure. 95 Many of the proposals did not meet the burden of
establishing that a new exemption to encourage crowdfunding would
be consistent with investor protection. Regardless of the amount of
money to be raised, any exemption for crowdfunding should include
some affirmative disclosure requirements. Those disclosures could be
less burdensome than those currently required under Regulation A,
but they should still be sufficiently detailed to provide investors with
sufficient information to enable them to make an informed
investment decision. The JOBS Act has set the stage for the SEC to
strike the appropriate balance when it implements the crowdfunding
exemption through rulemaking.
It is one thing to argue, as some have, that the exemptions are
too burdensome regardless of the forum for seeking financing.
19 6 If
those arguments are persuasive, then a more massive overhaul of the
exemptions was warranted, rather than a specific focus on
crowdfunding as a launching pad for a new exemption. It therefore
was appropriate that the JOBS Act took exactly that approach.
Exposing unsophisticated investors to risky investments without
adequate disclosure unduly sacrifices investor-protection goals to the
perceived need to lower the disclosure barriers for small businesses
and crowdfunding techniques. The Internet and social networking
offer fertile ground for scammers. Scammers and securities fraudsters
have for nearly a century found ways to adapt their scams to new
technologies.197 Consider, for example, high-pressure boiler room
sales operations 98 or the promotion of fictitious or worthless
securities to build Ponzi schemes.199 The Internet has also proven to
195. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 16, at 81; Cohn & Yadley, supra note 16, at 87; see
also C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case
for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 24 (2001) (proposing
an unconditional exemption for small offerings).
197. See, e.g., John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of
Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 898 (1999) (describing consumer vulnerability in
a changing commercial market, and in particular, abuse of the "pay-per-call" system in the
1980s); see infra note 202.
198. Boiler rooms are high pressure sales operations that have existed since the early
twentieth century. See, e.g., Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Enforcement Problems Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LAW. 665, 672-73 (1959) (describing the rising of the
boiler room scheme). The movie Boiler Room (New Line Cinema 2000) accurately
depicted many of the tactics used in the perpetration of securities brokers' high-pressure
sale frauds.
199. As one court explained:
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be fertile ground for pump and dump schemes.2" Boiler room tactics
have adapted to new technologies. For example, telephonic cold
calling has been supplemented or superseded by spain emails. 0 In
other words, the benefits of technology necessarily offer scammers
new opportunities. The Internet as a forum for crowdfunding thus
does not by itself warrant a special exemption. It is to be expected
that absent compliance with the crowdfunding exemption, the SEC
will vigorously pursue crowdfunding efforts without 1933 Act
registration. 2°2
The term "Ponzi Scheme" arises out of the remarkable criminal financial career of
Charles Ponzi. In December 1919, with $150, he began the business of borrowing
money on his promissory notes. He did not profess to receive money for
investment for account of the lender. He borrowed the money on his credit only.
He spread the false tale that, on his own account, he was engaged in buying
international postal coupons in foreign countries and selling them in other
countries at one hundred percent profit, and that this was made possible by the
excessive differences in the rates of exchange following the war. Ponzi induced
thousands to lend to him by promising in ninety days to pay them $150 for every
$100 loaned. Within eight months he took in $9,582,000, for which he issued notes
for $14,374,000. He paid his agents a commission of ten percent. He was always
insolvent, and made no investments of any kind, so that all the money he had at
any time was solely the result of loans by his dupes. By the time his scheme
collapsed, Ponzi was taking in about $1,000,000 a week.
State v. Hurd, Nos. 96APA03-326 to -328, 1999 WL 281305, at *4 n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. May
4, 1999) (citing Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 44 (1924)).
200. Pump and dump operations often involve high pressure recommendations,
withholding securities from the market, and other manipulative actions designed to inflate
a security's price before the manipulator dumps those shares on the market. See, e.g.,
Catton v. Def. Tech. Sys., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding sufficient
allegations of pump and dump scheme); SEC v. Wolfson, No. 2:02 CV 1086 TC, 2006 WL
1214994, at *10-11 (D. Utah May 5, 2006) (awarding summary judgment in SEC's favor
against perpetrators of pump and dump scheme); Scacci, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
41873, 70 SEC Docket 1290, 1999 WL 710848 (Sept. 14, 1999) (labeling the scheme at issue
a "classic" pump and dump manipulation); see also, e.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105,
107 (2d Cir. 2006) (determining that shareholders were affiliates and thus 1933 Act § 4(1)
was unavailable to shield 1933 Act § 5 violations in connection with pump and dump
scheme); Internet Firm, Officials, Face Charges in Alleged $100M 'Pump and Dump'
Scheme, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 957, 1323 (2001) (reporting that Internet firm
M&A West Inc. and its officers charged in connection with $100 million pump and dump
scheme).
201. Various boiler room techniques and legal consequences are discussed in 5 HAZEN,
supra note 8, § 14.18.
202. See, e.g., Migliozzi, Securities Act Release No. 33-9216, 2011 WL 2246317, at *2-3
(June 8, 2011) (resulting in a consent cease and desist order regarding crowdfunding
efforts without registration). Migliozzi involved a crowdfunding effort to raise money for
Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer. Participants were to receive crowdsourced ownership certificates
plus a quantity of beer valued at the amount of the participant's contribution. It is
interesting to compare this unsuccessful effort to bypass the 1933 Act's registration
requirements to a previous beer sales promotion offering shares as a "gift" with each case
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CONCLUSION
Congress adopted a new exemption that is tailored to
crowdfunding efforts. As noted above, Senate Bill 1791203 was a step
in the right direction. Senate Bill 197021 struck a much better balance
of removing barriers while still imposing a reasonable degree of
investor protection. A crowdfunding exemption conditioned on
meaningful disclosure represents the appropriate compromise
between the desire to encourage small business financing while at the
same time giving due attention to investor protection.
The new crowdfunding exemption is conditioned on mandated
disclosures that gives investors the opportunity to evaluate the merits
of the investment. As noted earlier, these disclosures are required in
the form of an offering circular that is sufficient to trigger a section
12(a)(2) claim should the disclosures be materially deficient.
205
Anything short of this would permit a general solicitation of investors
regardless of sophistication and would trigger the types of abuses that
led to the 1999 revision of the Rule 504 exemption.2 6 If history
teaches us anything, the lesson is that social media technologies
increase rather than decrease the potential for fraud. As such, it
makes no sense to sacrifice investor protection simply because there
are dollar limits on the investments solicited via crowdfunding.
Hopefully, the new crowdfunding exemption as implemented by the
SEC will provide sufficiently meaningful disclosure so that investors
receive the protection they both need and deserve.
of beer. See Am. Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 38280 (Jan. 27, 1999)
(finding that a stock "give away" was really a sale of securities); Vanderkam & Sanders,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 96 (Jan. 27, 1999) (noting that stock
give-away program giving "free" stock for visiting Internet site would be a sale of stock in
violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act).
203. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
206. See supra text accompanying note 173-76.
1769
1770 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90
